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E-mail addresses: jan_maarten.schraagen@tno.nl (Purpose: The aims of this study were to investigate how a variety of research methods is commonly
employed to study technology and practitioner cognition. User-interface issues with infusion pumps
were selected as a case because of its relevance to patient safety.
Methods: Starting from a Cognitive Systems Engineering perspective, we developed an Impact Flow Dia-
gram showing the relationship of computer technology, cognition, practitioner behavior, and system fail-
ure in the area of medical infusion devices. We subsequently conducted a systematic literature review on
user-interface issues with infusion pumps, categorized the studies in terms of methods employed, and
noted the usability problems found with particular methods. Next, we assigned usability problems and
related methods to the levels in the Impact Flow Diagram.
Results: Most study methods used to ﬁnd user interface issues with infusion pumps focused on observa-
ble behavior rather than on how artifacts shape cognition and collaboration. A concerted and theory-
driven application of these methods when testing infusion pumps is lacking in the literature. Detailed
analysis of one case study provided an illustration of how to apply the Impact Flow Diagram, as well
as how the scope of analysis may be broadened to include organizational and regulatory factors.
Conclusion: Research methods to uncover use problems with technology may be used in many ways, with
many different foci. We advocate the adoption of an Impact Flow Diagram perspective rather than merely
focusing on usability issues in isolation. Truly advancing patient safety requires the systematic adoption
of a systems perspective viewing people and technology as an ensemble, also in the design of medical
device technology.
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Designing for the safe use of medical device technology is an
overriding concern for medical device manufacturers, human fac-
tors engineers, practitioners, and regulatory bodies alike [1]. Fre-
quently, the design activity takes the perspective of an artifact as
an object rather than as a hypothesis about how the artifact shapes
cognition and collaboration [2]. As pointed out by Woods [2], stan-
dard human factors practice, driven by time and resource con-
straints, insulates the underlying concepts about how the system
will support practitioners from results of usability testing of spe-
ciﬁc features and choices. In contrast, the Cognitive Systems Engi-
neering contribution to design is not about the artifact as object,
but about how the artifact is part of and transforms the distributed
cognitive system.
One of the fundamental ﬁndings of Cognitive Science is that
artifacts shape cognition and collaboration [3]. Technological arti-
facts impact cognition in context by representing work demands
and underlying processes in particular ways. For instance, by
showing only current status, some medical devices neither account
for events that preceded the current state, nor indicate what to ex-
pect in the future [4]. This failure to develop representations that
reveal change and highlight events in the monitored process has
contributed to incidents where practitioners using such opaque
representations miss operationally signiﬁcant events due to im-
paired mental models [5]. Hence, there is a direct link from techno-
logical choices embodied in artifacts, to deﬁcient cognitive
processes in operational contexts, to incident evolution. This is
one of the main reasons to go ‘behind human error’ [5] and develop
a more extensive systemic analysis of incidents.
Cognitive Systems Engineering employs a wide variety of meth-
ods to study technology and practitioner cognition, ranging from
ethnomethodology and conversational analysis, to cognitive work
analysis and controlled studies [6–9]. However, there have been
few systematic studies to answer the question how one should
study the interaction of complex tools, cognition, collaboration
and context in the ﬁeld setting or workplace, in terms of strengths
and limitations of various methods. Woods [10] is an exception,
even though he did not systematically compare strengths and lim-
itations of various methods. Woods emphasized a family of meth-
ods he termed ‘staged world studies’ in which investigators stage
situations of interest through simulations of some type. For in-
stance, by introducing disruptions and contrasting conditions
relative to the artefacts, the investigator may observe, by using
process-tracing methods, how the distributed cognitive system re-
sponds. Our aim in this study was to map methods to the way arti-
facts shape cognition and collaboration. In particular, we developed
an Impact Flow Diagram (adapted from [5]) showing the relation-
ship of computer technology, cognition, practitioner behavior, and
system failure in the area of medical infusion devices. We subse-
quently conducted a systematic literature review on user-interface
issues with infusion pumps, categorized the studies in terms ofmethods employed, and noted the usability problems found with
particular methods. Next, we assigned usability problems and
related methods to the levels in the Impact Flow Diagram.
As our approach is primarily descriptive and retrospective, our
results will give an indication of the current practice of discovering
user-interface issues with a particular medical device. By focusing
on user-interface issues, we run the risk of limiting the ﬁeld of
view of our conceptual looking glasses, for instance by ignoring
collaborative or organizational aspects. In order to limit the risk
of this bias, we will devote a special paragraph to the larger context
surrounding user-interface issues, and illustrate this with a se-
lected case study from our literature review.
1.1. Medical infusion devices and use-related hazards
Infusion pumps are medical devices that deliver ﬂuids into a pa-
tient’s body in controlled amounts. Although infusion pumps have
contributed to improvements in patient care, they are not without
risks. For instance, from 2005 through 2009, the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) received approximately 56,000 reports of ad-
verse events associated with the use of infusion pumps, including
numerous injuries and deaths [1]. In the UK, at least 700 unsafe
incidents with infusion pumps are reported each year [11]. The
FDA distinguishes between three types of reported problems: soft-
ware defects, user interface issues, and mechanical or electrical
failures [1]. This systematic review focuses on user interface issues.
That user-interface issues with infusion pumps are widely re-
garded as a serious issue, is reﬂected by the FDA’s recent initiative
to improve pump safety [1]. In order to assure that use-related haz-
ards have been adequately controlled, the FDA [12] states that
three central steps are essential:
1. Identify anticipated use-related hazards (derived analytically,
for instance by heuristic analysis) and unanticipated use-
related hazards (derived through formative evaluations, for
instance simulated use testing).
2. Develop and apply strategies to mitigate or control use-related
hazards.
3. Demonstrate safe and effective device use through human fac-
tors validation testing (either simulated use validation testing
or clinical validation testing).
The analytical approaches and formative evaluations are com-
plementary, each having unique strengths and weaknesses with
respect to identifying, evaluating, and understanding use-related
hazards early in the design process. Formative evaluations can
demonstrate sufﬁcient use-safety for an infusion pump. Formative
evaluation has its strengths in a focus on critical tasks, challenging
or unusual use scenarios and the follow-up to determine the cause
of task failures. Potential limitations of formative evaluation in-
clude artiﬁcial testing conditions and limited range of users and
use conditions. Clinical validation testing has its strengths in
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glare), a broader range of users, and unanticipated use conditions,
but potential limitations include lack of control over use scenarios
and testing conditions.
Although the focus on use-related hazards is important, from a
Cognitive Systems Engineering perspective one runs the risk of
considering the artifact, in this case the infusion pump, as an ob-
ject rather than as a hypothesis about how it shapes cognition and
collaboration. In practice, this focus implies that speciﬁc features
of the artifact are iteratively improved by usability testing while
one remains blind to how more fundamental, frequently implicit,
technological choices impact representations and cognitive pro-
cesses. Just as the switch to the ‘glass cockpit’ in airplanes led
to certain pilot actions becoming invisible to the co-pilot, the
choice for computer technology in developing infusion pumps
necessarily implied the implicit adoption and acceptance of cer-
tain generalizable characteristics of computer technology, such
as the ‘keyhole representations’ of large data sets [5]. The implica-
tion for design methods is that the representations and cognitive
processes should be at the core of one’s attention, in addition to
more traditional outcome measures. One family of methods are
the process-tracing techniques, such as verbal protocols, and
knowledge elicitation techniques (see [6] for a review). Ulti-
mately, the purpose of these methods is to inform the design of
systems for cognitive work from the point of view of people work-
ing in ﬁelds of practice.
As we expected process-tracing methods to be relatively un-
known in the area of medical device technology, the primary
aim of this study was to conduct a systematic review on the focus
of methods commonly used in discovering user-interface issues
with infusion pumps. The rationale for this review and focus is,
ﬁrst, that user-interface issues with infusion pumps have high rel-
evance for patient safety, as human factors are commonly consid-
ered to be the leading cause of dosing errors [13], frequently
resulting from pump programming errors [14,15]. Second, the
case of infusion pumps is highly suitable as numerous studies
have been carried out into user-interface issues with infusion
pumps, thus providing a potentially large database to draw upon.
The current review follows the PRISMA statement for systematic
reviews to the extent permitted by the resulting extracted litera-
ture [16].2. Methods
2.1. Eligibility criteria
Literature was sought dealing with the user interface (or usabil-
ity, human–machine, programming) of infusion pumps (or intrave-
nous pump, infusion device, Patient-Controlled Analgesia [PCA]).
This particular focus does not lend itself easily to be formulated
in a Population, Intervention, Comparison, Outcome, Study design
(PICOS) question, as we did not want to restrict ourselves to a spe-
ciﬁc population and a speciﬁc intervention. By combining human
factors or human–machine interface (HMI) issues on the one hand
with the particular application area (infusion pumps) on the other
hand, we expected to retrieve a manageable number of records. We
restricted the reports retrieved to the years 1990–2011 and only
included reports written in English.2.2. Information sources
The search was conducted in the Scopus database, which in-
cludes PubMed and all relevant human factors journals. Date last
searched was August 1, 2012.2.3. Search
The search string used was:
(TITLE-ABS-KEY(‘‘human factors’’ OR ergonomics OR interface
OR ‘‘user-computer’’ OR ‘‘human-machine interaction’’ OR
usability OR hmi OR mmi OR programming))
AND
(TITLE-ABS-KEY(‘‘intravenous pump’’ OR ‘‘Patient-Controlled
analgesia’’ OR ‘‘Patient controlled analgesia’’ OR ‘‘infusion
pumps’’ OR ‘‘infusion pump’’ OR ‘‘intravenous pumps’’ OR ‘‘IV
pump’’ OR ‘‘IV pumps’’ OR ‘‘infusion device’’ OR ‘‘infusion
devices’’))
2.4. Study selection
Screening of records was carried out by the ﬁrst author based on
full abstracts. Articles that evidently addressed only mechanical
issues and/or technical issues with the delivery of ﬂuids were
excluded. Subsequently, the remaining full-text articles were as-
sessed for eligibility. Articles that did not present empirical data,
were insufﬁciently detailed (e.g., [33,44]) or highly deﬁcient meth-
odologically, review articles, or opinion articles (e.g., Letters to the
Editor) were excluded in this step. Studies focusing on highly
speciﬁc equipment problems [39,43], or speciﬁc procedures (e.g.,
handwritten versus computerized orders [27]) were also excluded.
2.5. Data collection process
As this review was not a quantitative meta-analysis, a qualita-
tive summary was written for each study included during data
extraction. In accordance with PRISMA [16], the following items
were included in the summaries: sample size, sample characteris-
tics (e.g., experience, clinical area), study period, study location
(e.g., size and type of hospital), error-reporting database inspected,
type of intervention (e.g., organizational, interface), tasks to be car-
ried out, design issues (e.g., counterbalancing order, within- or be-
tween-subjects, repetitions), evaluation criteria, types of pumps
used, measures (e.g., dosing errors, critical incidents, acceptance,
mode errors, time taken to complete tasks, preference, workload).
Due to the different nature of the studies retrieved, not all items
were included in each summary.
2.6. Risk of bias in individual studies
Risk of bias at the study level was assessed by comparing sev-
eral methodologically similar studies and noting differences,
assessing these differences, and noting limitations of the studies
as reported by the authors themselves. For instance, studies not
controlling for order in which different interfaces are evaluated
are subject to a higher risk of bias than studies in which order is
counterbalanced. Risk of bias at the outcome level was assessed
by recording whether outcome measures were based on self-re-
ports, expert judgments, observation of user behavior, or actual
readouts from pump databases. For instance, studies that heavily
rely on self-reports in error databases are more prone to bias at
the outcome level than studies that directly observe programming
errors.
2.7. Risk of bias across studies
Chan et al. [17] reported that incomplete outcome reporting is
common in randomized trials. Overall, 50% of efﬁcacy and 65% of
harm outcomes were incompletely reported (e.g., precise p-values
or effect sizes were not reported). Whether this should be called a
‘bias’ or a reporting convention is a matter of debate. Furthermore,
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terms of levels of statistical detail are subject to change over time.
Given that we included studies from 1990 onwards, substantial
differences in outcome reporting may be expected. Given, also, that
our focus in this review was not on comparing exact outcomes
across studies, but rather on the different methodologies used,
we decided not to focus on incomplete outcome reporting.3. Results and discussion
3.1. Study selection
Fig. 1 shows the ﬂow of information through the different
phases of the systematic review:
The study selection process (see Fig. 1) shows that no duplicates
were removed. In some cases, notably the work by Garmer et al.
[18], Lin et al. [19,20], Obradovich and Woods [21], and Wetter-
neck et al. [22], the same research was presented ﬁrst at a confer-
ence and was later published in a journal. We decided to retain all
versions, as slightly different aspects were emphasized in each
version. If one were to consider these studies as duplicates, ﬁve
records would be removed.
3.2. Categorization of studies
The 47 studies included in the ﬁnal analysis differed widely in
terms of methodology used. We decided to categorize the studies
in the following categories: experimental comparison (N = 8),
heuristic evaluations of existing pumps (N = 4), medical device
evaluation in hospital procurement (N = 4), observational studies
(N = 9), pre–post intervention studies (N = 9), retrospective analy-
ses (N = 6), and case studies (N = 7).
This categorization scheme was informed by established meth-
odological sources such as Shadish, Cook, and Campbell [51]. How-
ever, in order to better capture the richness involved in the various
studies, we decided to subcategorize studies further. For instance,
the categories ‘‘Heuristic evaluations of existing pumps’’ andFig. 1. Selection process used by the authors to identify appropriate p‘‘Medical device evaluation in hospital procurement’’ should
theoretically be placed under the main category of ‘‘Observational
studies’’. Yet, this would have neglected large methodological
differences among these studies aswell as potential interesting out-
comedifferences. The ﬁnal resulting categorization scheme is there-
fore not so much theoretically valid as well as heuristically valid for
this particular domain of research (user interface issues with infu-
sion pumps). Eventually, all 47 studies could be uniquely assigned
to one category (when a particular study consisted of more than
one methodological approach, the dominant approach was chosen
for classiﬁcation).
In Table 1, the 47 studies are grouped according to study type,
and further subdivided into study methods, variables, ﬁndings,
and methodological limitations. Section 3.3 will relate the study
ﬁndings to the Impact Flow Diagram, whereas Section 3.4 will
map the methods to the Impact Flow Diagram. Section 3.5 will dis-
cuss the relative strengths and weaknesses of the methods, based
on limitations noted by the authors themselves, and informed by
considerations from methodological sources such as [51]. Section
3.6 will describe a case study expanding the analysis to include
coordination and organizational aspects.3.3. Impact Flow Diagram
Table 1 shows a highly diverse list of ﬁndings. In order to struc-
ture these ﬁndings, we ﬁrst focused on usability issues, our ﬁrst to-
pic of interest in this review. Second, we made the relationships
explicit between the properties of the infusion pump as a medium,
the way infusion pumps represent the underlying process for
practitioners, and how these representations impact the cognitive
and collaborative behavior of practitioners. These relationships are
depicted in Fig. 2, in the form of an Impact Flow Diagram [5]. In the
following discussion, we will draw upon individual studies to illus-
trate our general points.
Fig. 2 depicts how infusion pump technology is an instance of
computer technology in general, and that there are design shaping
properties of the computer medium that make it easy for designersublished studies about userinterface issues with infusion pumps.
Table 1
Study type and methods, variables, ﬁndings and methodological limitations for each study included in the ﬁnal analysis.
Study Study type Studymethods Variables Findings Methodologicallimitations
Lin et al. [19,20] Experimental Comparison of existing
with redesigned interface
Time, workload,
errors, preference
Mean programming time on the New
interface was signiﬁcantly less than
with the Old interface. The New
interface led to signiﬁcantly less
workload than the Old interface and to
signiﬁcantly more reliable
performance. 23 out of 24 participants
expressed a preference for the New
interface design
Test participants were not experienced
nurses; clinical trials not conducted in
ﬁeld settings
Lin et al. [23,24] Experimental Comparison of existing
with redesigned interface
Time, workload,
errors, preference
Nurses made signiﬁcantly fewer
programming errors with the new
interface (13 errors) compared to the
old (29 errors). Programming time
with the new interface was 18% faster.
There was a nonsigniﬁcant 14%
decrease in workload with the new
interface over the old. Nine nurses
stated they favored the new interface,
1 preferred the old, and 2 were neutral
Clinical trials not conducted in ﬁeld
settings (e.g., impact of interruptions
not studied)
Garmer et al. [18,25,26] Experimental Comparison of existing
with redesigned interface
Time, errors,
preference, use of
manual
Time to complete test tasks was
signiﬁcantly longer for the existing
interface (260 s) as compared to the
new interface (188 s). Differences in
number of errors between interfaces
were not signiﬁcant. Subjective data
(questionnaires) showed that when
subjects used the new interface they
thought they had better control of
operations, were more sure they had
set the infusion correctly and that it
was easier to correct errors
(p < .05).The manual was used 29 times
for the existing interface but only 8
times for the new interface (p < .05)
Relatively small user groups (N = 6);
clinical trials not conducted in ﬁeld
settings
Trbovich et al. [28] Experimental Comparison of three
pump types: traditional,
smart, barcode
% planted drug
errors remedied
Pump type did not signiﬁcantly impact
the ability to remedy ‘‘wrong drug’’
errors. When provided with the
ﬂexibility to override limits, nurses
often did so, even when clinically
inappropriate
Large numbers of planted errors might
have inﬂuenced participants to behave
differently than they would under
clinical circumstances where these
errors occur less frequently
Zhang et al. [29] Heuristic Usability inspection of
two volumetric pumps
by four evaluators
Number of
violations of
heuristics; severity
of violations
14 heuristics were applied.
Consistency and Visibility were the
two most frequently violated
heuristics. Differences between pumps
were found in terms of number and
severity of heuristic violations
Heuristic evaluation does not identify
major missing functionality; it requires
both domain knowledge and usability
expertise; it may not identify problems
that arise because of the device’s use
environment, for instance, lighting and
noise
Gagnon et al. [30] Heuristic User-centered evaluation
to determine the
effectiveness and
usability of three
frequently used infusion
pumps
Problems, severity,
positive and
negative features
Both newer devices provided useful
dosage calculation assistance, and
useful feedback about the current state
of the device. A signiﬁcant
shortcoming of both newer devices
was the inability to navigate
backwards through the infusion set-up
screens to correct a previous entry.
Neither manufacturer incorporated a
Back-button/function
Evaluators lacked both domain
experience and experience in heuristic
evaluation. This led to considerable
differences of opinion and replication
of problems across evaluators using
the same device
Graham et al. [31] Heuristic Four raters conducted a
heuristic evaluation of a
three-channel infusion
pump interface
Violations of 14
usability heuristics
The most severe violations were
spread out across at least 8 of the 14
usability heuristics. Two heuristics,
‘‘Consistency’’ and ‘‘Language’’, were
found to have the most violations.
Consistency demands that users should
not have to wonder whether different
words, situations, or actions mean the
same thing. The Language heuristic
demands that the intended users
should always have the language of the
system presented in a form
understandable to them
Heuristic evaluation does not identify
major missing functionality; it requires
both domain knowledge and usability
expertise; it may not identify problems
that arise because of the device’s use
environment, for instance, lighting and
noise
Turley et al. [32] Heuristic
evaluation of
manuals
instead of
devices
Review of ﬁve medical
device operating
manuals
Information
contained in the
manuals was
checked against
usability heuristics
On the basis of the number of
heuristics violated, the average
severity rating, and the affordance
violations, one particular pump
received the highest recommendation
Method is entirely dependent on the
information that the manufacturer
provides
(continued on next page)
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Ginsburg [34] Mixed methods Heuristic evaluation, user
testing
Expert ratings,
errors, user
preferences
A discrepancy was found between
results from user testing and user
preference, because of prior experience
with particular pumps, and because
users rated devices on ease-of-use
rather than safety
No novice users available or tested,
small sample size in each clinical area,
scenarios did not include all tasks but
rather a sample of representative tasks,
pump order not counterbalanced
within each area, testing conditions
not strictly controlled across
participants or clinical area, some
errors may have been missed by the
observer as no video recordings were
made
Namshirin et al. [35] Mixed methods Heuristic evaluation,
cognitive walkthrough,
usability evaluation,
clinical evaluation
Violation of
heuristics, user
challenges,
efﬁciency, number
of errors, user
satisfaction
Results of the heuristic evaluation
coincided with those of the technical
evaluation, and led to the removal of
two pumps from the procurement
process. The project was subject to
stringent time constraints and
usability analysis focused on the
qualitative metrics rather than the
quantitative ones. Largely based on
questionnaire responses, one pump
was chosen unanimously
Not clear whether the three
representative tasks that were chosen
for usability evaluation also
constituted critical tasks. Behavioral
metrics were largely ignored in favor of
questionnaire responses, hence ﬁnal
pump chosen, while preferred by users,
could be unsafe
Keselman et al. [36] Mixed methods Interviews, document
analysis
Thematic coding
categories,
semantic
relationships
Participants’ conception of safety-
relevant device aspects was somewhat
narrow and there was no overall
collective perception where all
perspectives were represented.
Administrators equated equipment-
related safety with technical accuracy
and reliability instead of usability
issues
Retrospective bias may have
inﬂuenced the interpretation of the
data
Nemeth et al. [37] Mixed methods Expert analysis, usability
assessment, adverse
event self-reporting, ﬁeld
observation
Subject actions and
comments,
analysis of
programming
actions from ﬁles
A sample of 19 nurses was recruited for
the usability sessions. Results showed
no deﬁnite advantage for one of the
pumps over the others. Subjects
regularly ignored dose limiting
software. Subjects did not beneﬁt from
their previous experience with a
particular device. There were some
discrepancies between what subjects
said they found positive and their
actual behavior
Testing was not carried out with
instructions for use: nurses only
received a brief orientation to pump
operation before starting. No
quantitative data are reported
Obradovich and
Woods [21,45]
Observational
(use problems)
Interviews, bench tests,
observations of use
Error-prone tasks,
device
characteristics,
context analysis,
tailoring strategies
Main categories of use problems: (1)
complex and arbitrary sequences of
operation (2) different operating
modes intended for different contexts
(3) ambiguous alarms (4) getting lost:
given the arbitrary command
sequences and the lack of feedback,
users can enter a command and be
surprised by the result (5) poor
feedback on device state and behavior
Unclear how many users were
observed and whether the deﬁciencies
observed were critical and
representative of the full set of possible
deﬁciencies
Liljegren et al. [40] Observational
(use problems)
Field studies, evaluation
of pump use, incident
analysis
Classes of incidents A total of 13 types of incidents could be
found, of which two were connected to
the user interface: (1) switching the
functions Volume To Be Infused and
Flow Rate, which lead to the pump
being set to deliver e.g. 27 mL at
350 mL/h instead of 350 mL at 27 mL/
h. (2) misreading the numerical display
i.e. reading 27.0 mL/h as 270 mL/h or
035 mL/h as 3.5 mL/h
Unclear how many users were
observed and what tasks they had to
carry out under what circumstances
Nunnally et al. [42] Observational
(use problems)
Video recording of pump
programming, ﬁnite state
analysis
Efﬁciency, choice
of mode and
sequence selection
Practitioners (anesthesiologists and
ICU nurses) entered 57.1% more
keystrokes than necessary to
accomplish the tasks. 69.5% of all
keystrokes used were goal-directed.
More experienced users did not use
more goal-directed keystrokes
Pump programming not studied in
actual conditions. Tasks not identical
across subjects
Ahmad et al. [15] Observational
(prospectively
collected
incidents)
Critical incident analysis Types of critical
incidents
Over a period of 60 months, 27 Critical
Incidents (0.32%) were identiﬁed
through self-report and investigated.
Three main categories of incidents
were identiﬁed: programming errors,
breaches of policy and patient
Reporting of critical incidents partially
dependent on self-report
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selection. Of the 27 CIs, 18 (66.6%)
were due to programming errors and
six were breaches in hospital policy. Of
these 18, nine were incorrect bolus
doses and the other 9 were incorrect
drug concentrations
Husch et al. [47] Observational
(prospectively
collected
incidents)
Single-day direct
observation of every drug
administration
Rate deviations
and other errors
During the data collection period, 486
patients receiving infusions via PCA
and general IV pumps were included in
the study. An IV pump was used for
286 of these patients. Of the 389 errors
noted overall, 37 were rate deviation
errors and three of these were judged
to be due to a programming mistake,
while errors associated with orders,
documentation, labeling and patient
identiﬁcation were more frequent
Data were collected on one particular
day only, which may not have been
representative for other days or other
periods of the year
Taxis and Barber [48] Observational
(drug
preparation
and
administration)
Direct observation of 113
nurses on 76 study days
Number and types
of drug errors
265 IV drug errors were identiﬁed
during observation of 483 drug
preparations and 447 administrations.
The most common type of error was
the deliberate violation of guidelines
when injecting bolus doses faster than
the recommended speed of 3–5 min
Only one observer recorded drug
errors, which may make results less
reliable. The observer did not interview
nurses in depth, as a result of which
some information relevant to
prescribing errors may have been
missed
Brixey et al. [49] Observational
(legibility)
Observations by two
observers of pump use
Ambient light
level, photographs,
ﬁeld notes
For the pump used in this study, the
only text that was clearly visible from
the foot of the patient’s bed was for the
rate of infusion displayed in the
uppermost screens. Legibility for the
other screens was reduced because of
the font size (3.1–4.7 mm) and
background colors (black characters on
a yellow background)
Study was limited to a convenience
sample of a single model of a dual-
channel infusion pump
Johnson et al. [50] Observational
(attitudes)
Questionnaires Attitudes toward
medical device use
errors
Traditional view of blaming the
operator was still prevalent
Limited sample size (N = 26) for an
attitude survey
Adachi and Lodolce
[14]
Pre–post
intervention
Observation of pump-
related errors before and
after interventions
Pump-related
errors as% of
dosing errors
In 2003, pump-related errors
accounted for 22% (10 of 46 errors) of
dosing errors, compared with 41% (24
of 59 errors) in 2002. Although
statistical tests were not reported, this
is a statistically signiﬁcant difference
(X2(1) = 4.234, p = 0.04)
Unclear whether pump-related errors
decreased as a result of the
interventions. Multiple interventions
introduced at the same time, making it
impossible to attribute success to one
speciﬁc process change
Apkon et al. [52] Pre–post
intervention
Observation of resource
consumption and staff
satisfaction
Purchasing and
pharmacy records;
questionnaire
The combined effect of prolonging
infusion hang times, preparation in the
pharmacy, and purchasing
premanufactured solutions resulted in
1500 fewer infusions prepared by
nurses per year, with fewer
opportunities for error. Nursing staff
expressed a signiﬁcant preference for
the revised process
Actual failure rates were not measured.
Multiple interventions were
introduced simultaneously, making it
impossible to attribute success to one
speciﬁc process change
Carayon et al. [53] Pre–post
intervention
Three longitudinal
surveys after
introduction of smart IV
pump
Implementation
process; technical
performance;
usability; user
acceptance
The main problems with the Smart IV
pump technology reported by nurses
included air-in-line alarms, and beeps
resulting from a delay. Nurses’
perceptions of pump reliability and
noise did not improve after 1 year,
despite the fact that nurses had been
using the Smart IV pump for a
signiﬁcant amount of time. Nurses’
perceptions of usability (e.g.,
learnability, efﬁciency, error recovery,
and satisfaction) tended to improve
1 year after implementation
Actual pump use was not studied, nor
how actual pump use inﬂuenced safety
outcomes
Eade [54] Pre–post
intervention
Evaluation of
intervention program to
teach nurses how to
program pump
Knowledge test,
PCA errors
During a 5-month evaluation period,
no errors occurred on the unit
participating in the study, although
PCA errors occurred on other units not
participating
Lack of statistical analysis, lack of
detail on the educational intervention,
and how soon the evaluation period
came after the intervention. Most
importantly, 17 nurses and a 5-month
period are in all likelihood too limited
to note any errors, given that on
average, every year only 3 errors were
reported for the entire hospital under
study
(continued on next page)
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Ferguson et al. [55] Pre–post
intervention
Evaluation study of
mandatory training for
all registered nurses
Number of
programming
errors
A statistically signiﬁcant decrease from
8 to 1 programming errors was found
after the training program was
completed by more than 900 nurses
Possible underreporting of errors, post-
study due to awareness of the
intervention time, changes in
personnel over the course of 1 year,
recency of the intervention (there was
only a 1-month period between the
intervention and post-intervention
data collection, so that the effects may
not sustain over time)
Moss [56] Pre–post
intervention
Improvement of PCA
process by FMEA process
PCA errors 19% decrease in the number of
reported PCA errors during 2009
compared with 2003 (21 versus 26). No
statistical signiﬁcance testing reported
Multiple interventions introduced
simultaneously, making it impossible
to attribute success to one speciﬁc
process change. PCA errors not
measured directly, but dependent on
self-reporting
Paul et al. [57] Pre–post
intervention
Review of critical
incident reports before
and after safety
interventions
PCA errors In more than 25,000 patients using PCA
pumps, errors occurred in 0.25% of the
cases (62 in total), with negative
effects (some harm, e.g., respiratory
depression and uncontrolled pain, but
no documented deaths) to one-third of
these patients. 49 of the PCA errors
occurred before the safety intervention
and 13 after (odds ratio 0.28; 95%
CI = 0.14, 0.53; p < .001). The most
common causes of PCA errors were
programming errors (33.9%). All 21
PCA programming errors occurred
before the safety interventions were
instituted (odds ratio 0.05; 95%
CI = 0.001, 0.30; p = .001). For the total
errors, 77.4% involved incorrect doses
(48 of 62), with 59.6% of such errors
being an overdose
This being a pre–post intervention
without control study, it is possible
that the observed reduction in errors
was the result of factors other than the
safety interventions. Vicente et al. [58]
estimated mortality rates from pump-
programming errors between 1 in
33,000 and 1 in 338,800, hence even
the large sample size (25,000) in this
study was likely too small to estimate
mortality risk from PCA
misprogramming. Furthermore, it is
not clear to what extent the new PCA
pumps or any of the other
interventions, alone or in combination,
contributed to the observed reduction
in errors
Rothschild et al. [59] Pre–post
intervention
Non-blinded, prospective
time series evaluation of
effect of smart pumps on
medication errors
Incidence and
nature of
medication errors
and adverse drug
events
Smart pumps did not reduce the rate of
serious medication errors, in part
because the pump setup made it easy
for nurses to bypass the drug library
(24% bypass rate) and because
overrides were frequent
Power for detecting a decrease in the
rate of life-threatening events was
limited because of their low frequency.
The extent of alert overrides and
library bypasses may have reduced the
effectiveness of the intervention. A
randomized controlled trial could not
be safely implemented
Wetterneck et al. [60] Pre–post
intervention
Evaluation of smart iv
pump by FMEA
Failure modes No speciﬁc before–after data were
reported in this study
Impossible to evaluate effectiveness of
design changes
Hicks et al. [13] Retrospective
analysis of
error records
Analysis of voluntary
reports to MEDMARX
% of error records
associated with
PCA
For a 5-year review period, 9571 (1%)
of error records were associated with
PCA—624 (6.5%) of which resulted in
patient harm (from temporary harm to
patient death). The leading type of
error was improper dosage or quantity
(38%), the majority of which occurred
during drug administration
Precise numbers on the frequency of
incorrect programming were not
reported. Results are highly dependent
on the quality of error-reporting, in
particular the accuracy and
completeness of the reports. Method
does not yield detailed insights into
usability issues, and may be subject to
numerous biases, such as the outcome
bias [63,64] and the hindsight bias [65]
Lori Brown et al. [61] Retrospective
analysis of
error records
Screening of MDR
database for ‘use error’
Qualitative
description of PCA
adverse events
Three categories of PCA pump adverse
events are described: product
packaging, drug concentration
programming, and improper
administration set loading
The accuracy and completeness of
these reports were not veriﬁed, and
they varied greatly as to the level of
detail. No quantitative results were
reported
Thornburg et al. [62] Retrospective
analysis of
error records
Categorization of adverse
medical events reports
Frequency of
occurrence
The three most frequent occurrences
were: failure to open intravenous
infusion ‘‘piggyback’’ medication bag
clamp (23.1%), medication
identiﬁcation failure (13.7%), and
pump programming (11.5%)
Event reports limited to three hospitals
and a 1-year period. Results are highly
dependent on the quality of error-
reporting, in particular the accuracy
and completeness of the reports
Malashock et al. [63] Retrospective
analysis of
device alerts
Data download of smart
infusion software
Device alerts 157 (18%) alerts resulted in
reprogramming of the device, while
users chose to override 696 (82%)
alerts during the 8-month study period
Data about over-rides do not indicate
how many of these events were true
versus false alerts. If true and
overridden, then safety issue; if false
and frequent and overridden, then
potential for future disregard of true
alert
Rayo et al. [64] Retrospective
analysis of
device alerts
Data download of smart
infusion software
Device alerts In 12% of the cases, the alert caused the
clinician to change the input. The alert
was overridden in 88% of the cases.
Data about over-rides do not indicate
how many of these events were true
versus false alerts. If true and
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56% of the overridden alerts were not
readjusted to within the DERS’s
recommended limits
overridden, then safety issue; if false
and frequent and overridden, then
potential for future disregard of true
alert
Kingman et al. [65] Retrospective
analysis of
administration
errors
Interviews and electronic
survey
Self-report of
prostacyclin
administration
errors
Serious errors in medication
administration were reported by 68%
of survey respondents. In separate
interviews, 94% reported serious
errors. Errors occurred for the
following reasons: incorrect cassette
placed in pump, due to identical
appearance of cassettes; inaccurate
pump programming; errant drug
dosing; inadvertent cessation of the
pump
True error rates could not be reported,
as the number of in-patient
prostacyclin exposure days for each
respondent’s center was unknown
Vicente et al. [58] Case study Qualitative event
reconstruction, MDR
database search
Patient records,
autopsy report,
toxicology results,
interviews
A drug cassette containing 1 mg mL1
solution of morphine was unavailable,
so the nurse used a cassette that
contained a more concentrated
solution (5 mg mL1). The available
evidence is consistent with a
concentration programming error
where morphine 1 mg mL1 was
entered instead of 5 mg mL1
Various factors contributed to the
adverse drug event; it is unclear
whether a programming error was the
major factor. Results may not
generalize to other types of pumps or
other situations
Draper et al. [66] Case study Reproduction of infusion
error with pump in
question, database
search
Syringe size,
dosage size
The pump itself worked correctly,
hence ‘‘no problem found’’. The
problem originated with the ‘‘size
override’’ function, which, when
enabled, allows the operator to
program the pump for a syringe size
that differs from the standard program
to allow for ‘‘nonstandard’’ infusion
scenarios. In this case, the infusion
error could be reproduced by setting
the syringe size to the same size as the
dosage size
‘‘Size override’’ function may be
speciﬁc to particular types of pumps.
Measures to prevent the error
(disabling the override function) may
have unanticipated consequences.
Reasons behind the infusion error are
not uniquely identiﬁable
Musshoff et al. [67] Case study Toxicological analysis,
analysis of pump history
Tissue distribution
of piritramide
The PCA pump had been changed
during a previous servicing from
displaying mg/h to mL/h, therefore, the
anesthetist had entered ‘‘1.5’’
assuming mg/h, but actually applying
1.5 mL/h (equivalent to 2.25 mg/h).
The change of displayed units had been
indicated by a red sticker on the
backside of the pump
Various factors contributed to the
adverse drug event; it is unclear
whether a programming error was the
major factor. Results may not
generalize to other types of pumps or
other situations
Perry [68] Case study Qualitative case
description
None Users thought they had stopped the
infusion but actually had not. A
device’s operation and status should be
apparent to the user
Case described in insufﬁcient detail
Rule et al. [69] Case study Root Cause Analysis Various safety
issues
Several safety issues were identiﬁed:
skipping steps in the checklist; making
assumptions about the patient’s
implicit goals (saving time due to prior
knowledge), time and workload
pressure on the part of the nurse, the
insulin pump not having fail-safe
mechanisms to alert the user that the
pivotal priming step had not occurred,
company’s training materials did not
contain documentation of the change
in priming steps, critical information
about additional insulin that was
administered in the clinic via syringe
was not shared among all parties
involved (company’s representative,
nurse, patient), clouding the
subsequent interpretation of the
patient’s blood sugars
Cause for lack of insulin delivery with
the new pump was multifactorial. It is
unclear what was the major factor and
what recommendations should be
made on the basis of the Root Cause
Analysis
Syed et al. [70] Case study Qualitative event
reconstruction
Historical pump
data, interviews,
chart review
Morphine concentration was
incorrectly programmed in an infuser:
instead of 5 mg mL1, it was set at
0.5 mg mL1. This setting resulted in
the administered dose being ten times
greater than the prescribed dose (in
this case, 20 mg boluses instead of
Retrospective event reconstruction is
vulnerable to outcome bias and
hindsight bias, particularly in the
absence of adequate critical incident
reporting
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2 mg). Multiple caregivers, insufﬁcient
handover, incorrect assumptions, and
distributed knowledge contributed to
the adverse event
Vicente [71] Case study Qualitative event
reconstruction
Chronology of
events
The manufacturer initially exhibited
the traditional approach to medical
error for years, with an emphasis on
better nurse training. This long period
was followed by a comparatively
abrupt shift toward human factors
design. The shift was preceded by a 9-
month period characterized by new
leadership, a perception of poor
organizational performance, and a
disruption of the operating
environment (e.g. pressures from
government and public opinion)
Event reconstruction was not based on
internal company documents. No valid
method available for weighing the
relative inﬂuence of events on cultural
change
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For instance, the general property of ‘virtuality’ means that there is
nothing inherent in the computer medium that constrains the rela-
tionship between things represented and their representation.
What needs to be represented is the larger therapy plan or dose–
time relationships [45]. However, contemporary infusion device
displays are limited to showing only current status, and offer no
evidence of context that drove changes to infusion rate, nor of fu-
ture implications of infusion rate changes [4,46]. The infusion de-
vice has the capability to ‘make us smart’ [3], yet it ‘makes us
dumb’, as it does not answer the questions in the mind of a
clinician.
Further, the ‘keyhole’ property of the computer medium, shared
by infusion devices, means that the size of the available display
units is very small relative to the size of the number of data dis-
plays that potentially could be examined. This particular property
leads to some typical representational properties of the design,
such as deep hierarchical levels with a vast number of program-
ming pathways [42], complex and arbitrary sequences of operation
[45], and different operating modes intended for different contexts
[45]. In turn, these representational properties shape the cognitive
systems involved and lead to increased memory demands and im-
pair the development of accurate mental models of the pump, as
demonstrated by Nunnally et al.’s [42] failure to ﬁnd a relationship
between level of experience and ability to use the pump. In the
end, these cognitive systems have inevitable behavior shaping
properties and their impact on operational processes is shown as
programming errors [15,57,58,68] or ‘mode errors’ [40,45].
Finally, the general property of interactivity means that com-
puter technology should make pertinent aspects of its status and
intentions obvious, should enable a collaborative approach, and
participate in managing attention to the most important signals
without overwhelming the user with low-level messages. When
not done properly, ambiguous alarms [45,53] and poor feedback
on device state and behavior result [45]. Poor feedback and ambig-
uous alarms shape cognition by complicating situation assessment
and enhancing stress on workload management. These properties
of cognitive systems shape resultant practitioner behavior, in that
alerts are frequently overridden [64,65], drug libraries are by-
passed [59] in order to reduce stress on workload, and infusion is
inadvertently stopped [66,69,70] because of poor feedback on sys-
tem status.
In conclusion, the ﬁndings present a pattern that is representa-
tive for the generally unreﬂective use of computer technology by
designers. The design shaping properties of the computer medium
(e.g., virtuality, keyhole effect) stimulate designers to create de-vices with typical ﬂaws in human–computer cooperation. In the
case of infusion devices, typical ﬂaws such as proliferating modes,
making the system opaque, and providing poor feedback, create
new cognitive demands, such as increased memory demands, im-
paired mental models, and poor situation assessment. These design
deﬁciencies become problems that possibly contribute to incidents
if other factors are present, such as distraction or increase in work-
load [70]. Although the Impact Flow Diagrammay give the impres-
sion that the cognition-shaping properties of representations only
affect individual caregivers, unreﬂective use of technology is in fact
about miscoordination between the human andmachine portion of
a single ensemble, with the human portion frequently being dis-
tributed across multiple caregivers. Coordination across caregivers
is an aspect that has not received sufﬁcient attention in the litera-
ture reviewed here, although there are some hints of its impor-
tance [21,70]. In paragraph 3.6, we will re-analyze Syed et al.’s
case study [70], by paying special attention to coordination and
organizational aspects.
3.4. Mapping methods to the Impact Flow Diagram
The ﬁndings reported in Table 1, with the associated study type
and study methods, were coded for presence of key words listed at
the right-hand side of the Impact Flow Diagram (Fig. 2). Next, the
associated methods were assigned independently by the two
authors to one of the four levels in the Impact Flow Diagram (i.e.,
Computer Technology; Computer Based Devices; Joint Cognitive
Systems; Infusion Pump Technology). A Cohen’s unweighted Kappa
of .75 showed good agreement between the two coders. Remaining
discrepancies were resolved by discussion. This yielded the follow-
ing mapping (see Table 2):
The results of the mapping process show a number of interest-
ing points. First, the majority of the study methods employed in
previous studies uncovering user interface issues with infusion
pumps deal with the impact of behavior shaping properties of cog-
nitive systems on operational processes, that is, use errors. Second,
none of the methods employed dealt with general properties of
computer technology. Apparently, these properties are not the di-
rect focus of most study methods. Third, not surprisingly, the
observational studies on use problems excel at determining the
impact of the general properties of computer technology on the
representational properties of the design. This is not surprising gi-
ven that these observational studies, in particular [21,42,45], were
carried out within a Cognitive Systems Engineering framework
that formed the basis for the Impact Flow Diagram. Fourth, the
impact of the cognition shaping properties of representations on
Fig. 2. Impact Flow Diagram deﬁning a failure path for the uncritical use of infusion pump technology.
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issues such as increased memory demands, complicated situation
assessment and inaccurate mental models of pump design are
being dealt with only sparingly in the studies retrieved. Finally,
although the mapping process yielded some ambiguity regarding
heuristic evaluations, inspection of the full list of heuristics in
the primary sources, e.g., [29], made it clear that these heuristics
focus primarily on representations.
In conclusion, covering all levels in the Impact Flow Diagram re-
quires a combination of methods, in particular observational stud-
ies, case studies, heuristic analysis and experimental comparisons.
Even then, these methods by themselves do not deal with general
properties of computer technology.
3.5. Strengths and limitations of methods
Strengths and limitations of methods were derived from the
limitations noted by authors themselves (listed in Table 1), in con-
junction with general methodological sources such as [51]. The
case studies (1), the heuristic evaluations (2), and the observational
studies (3) excel at ﬁnding usability issues, ranging from quite spe-
ciﬁc in some case studies to more general in some observational
studies. These usability issues are being dealt with in attempts to
design new and improved interfaces for infusion pumps. Compar-
ing these new interfaces with existing interfaces is a relative
strength of experimental comparisons (4). These comparisons yield
precise and quantitative data on the speed and accuracy with
which programming tasks are carried out. Together, these four
methods yield information on usability issues that stays closestto the user interface. When used together in a sensible way, for in-
stance in a mixed-methods study, the methodological limitations
of these methods may be mitigated as they are complementary
in some cases. It should be noted that some observational studies
on use problems ([21,42,45]) and some experimental comparison
studies ([19,20]) provided a wealth of information on mental rep-
resentations and cognitive processes that went beyond observable
behaviors. For instance, Lin et al. [19,20] carried out an extensive
cognitive task analysis that served as a foundation for their newly
developed interface design.
The other methods, retrospective analysis (5) and pre–post
intervention (6), although broadening the scope of issues that
may go wrong during the infusion process, suffer from a number
of limitations. Retrospective analysis of medication error records
is highly dependent on the quality of error-reporting, in particular
the accuracy and completeness of the reports. Due to the fact that
the researcher using these reports is dependent upon a third party
for providing these reports, there is ultimately no control over data
collection procedures and, hence, quality of data outcome. Retro-
spective analysis may give a very broad indication of the incidence
of PCA-related errors, relative to other types of errors, its effects on
patient harm, and its occurrence during particular phases of the
medication-use process. However, in comparison with other
methods, this method does not yield detailed insights into usabil-
ity issues, and may be subject to numerous biases, such as the out-
come bias [72,73] and the hindsight bias [74]. And, like all
retrospective methods, it may prematurely attribute failure to ‘‘hu-
man error’’, it may overly simplify the dilemmas and difﬁculties
practitioners face, and may not explain failure at all, but merely
Table 2
Mapping of study type/methods to Impact Flow Diagram levels.
Level Number of studies Study type/method
Computer technology 0 None
Computer based devices 10 Observational studies (use problems); Heuristic Evaluation
Joint cognitive systems 3 Case study
Infusion pump technology 34 User testing; Observational studies (prospectively collected incidents; drug preparation and administration);
Pre–post Intervention; Experimental comparisons; Retrospective analysis; Qualitative event reconstruction;
Root Cause Analysis
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is quite different in this respect, as it observes reductions in
medication errors after a particular suite of interventions has been
introduced. These interventions frequently go beyond relatively
isolated changes in interface design, but rather involve training
programs, changes in work procedures, and the introduction of
smart pumps. Frequently lacking a control group and introducing
multiple intervention measures simultaneously, these methods
do not allow one to draw inferences about causality (see [51]).
Finally, medical device evaluation in hospital procurement (7)
constitutes a retrospective reﬂection on the usefulness of various
methods employed during the acquisition of new medical devices.
It has yielded interesting issues to take into account during a pro-
curement process. In particular, as already noted by Woods [2],
there may be a tendency, due to time and resource constraints,
to narrowly focus on user preferences rather than user behavior,
and to equate safety with technical accuracy rather than usability.
Underlying concepts about how the system will support practitio-
ners are hardly ever being dealt with during hospital procurement
processes.
In conclusion, from the perspective of design of cognitive work
from the point of view of people working in ﬁelds of practice, there
is a scarcity of methods that focus on tracing cognitive processes.
Combining several methods (in particular, observational studies,
heuristic analysis, and experimental comparison) may yield a
broader picture, but only when the focus when using these meth-
ods is on uncovering representations and cognitive processes.
There is nothing inherent in the methods themselves that prevent
a researcher from narrowly focusing on observable behavior alone,
nor in focusing on individual determinants alone. The next para-
graph illustrates how to go beyond individual determinants, as
well as providing an illustration of applying the Impact Flow Dia-
gram in a case study.
3.6. Case study: how medical device technology and organizational
policy shape cognition and collaboration
In order to prevent a narrow focus on individual cognition shap-
ing properties to the exclusion of collaboration shaping properties,
we will discuss a particular case study, [70], in somewhat more de-
tail. It should be mentioned that this particular case study was not
carried out from a Cognitive Systems Engineering perspective.
However, since it used some typical Cognitive Systems Engineering
methods (e.g., qualitative event reconstruction using interviews), it
may be reinterpreted in terms of our Impact Flow Diagram.
In a hospital setting, morphine concentration was incorrectly
programmed in a PCA infuser by two nurses: instead of 5 mg mL1,
it was set at 0.5 mg mL1. The concentration programming error
with this pump has been reported previously [58] and results from
a low default setting as the initial choice. The most common pro-
gramming error is to enter the default concentration. This setting
resulted in the administered dose being ten times greater than
the prescribed dose (in this case, 20 mg boluses instead of 2 mg).
Because the PCA was incorrectly attached to the patient, thepatient initially did not receive morphine. The incorrect concentra-
tion setting was discovered by a third nurse and the pump was
reprogrammed by the second nurse. Still, the patient reported back
pain. A fourth nurse later in the afternoon discovered the incorrect
attachment and corrected the position of the back check valve.
Shortly after this, the anesthesiologist visited the patient during
routine pain rounds and found her to be cyanosed, somnolent
and apneic. The patient made a full recovery after resuscitative
measures were taken. The pump was replaced by more up to date
technology. Neither of the two nurses involved in the initial pro-
gramming of the pump was familiar with the programming.
Compounding the programming error was the misplacement of
the back-check valve, which allowed a large reservoir of morphine
to accumulate, most likely in the empty antibiotic bag, which was
piggybacked into the main iv line earlier in the day. Nurses were
not alerted to potential problems with the system, even after
153 mg of morphine had been delivered from the pump over a per-
iod of 90 min and the patient was still complaining of pain. The
third nurse suspected a programming error and alerted the second
nurse, who reprogrammed the pump to its desired setting. The
fourth nurse later recognized that the back check valve was incor-
rectly attached; however, she assumed that the antibiotic bag con-
tained cefazolin instead of the accumulated morphine. When she
ﬂushed the iv line and allowed its contents to be administered, a
massive dose of morphine was delivered. The patient’s rapid
change in level of pain and the onset of drowsiness were taken
for an appropriate response to morphine. According to the authors
of this case study, multiple caregivers, insufﬁcient handover, incor-
rect assumptions, and distributed knowledge contributed to the
adverse event.
In terms of our Impact Flow Diagram, it is clear that the pro-
gramming error resulted from the general property of virtuality
(freedom from physical constraints), which enabled the pump to
return to a low default setting as the initial choice. This, combined
with poor feedback on device state and behavior led to an inaccu-
rate mental model of the pump behavior, which resulted in a pro-
gramming error. In addition to this programming error, there also
was an incorrect attachment of the PCA tubing to the patient. This
has nothing to do with computer technology, but it represents a
design ﬂaw in that there was no ‘forcing function’ [3] to constrain
the sequence of user actions: nurses could misplace the back-check
valve without feedback that the morphine would accumulate in an
empty antibiotic bag. The impact on the nurses’ cognitive system
was again that an inaccurate mental model was developed, this
time of the joint patient-pump relationship. The impact on opera-
tional processes was to inadvertently cease infusion, as the patient
did not receive any morphine while it was being redirected to the
antibiotic bag.
It is important to think of people and technology, not as inde-
pendent components, but rather as a single ensemble where break-
downs in coordination may occur [5]. The Joint Cognitive Systems
in the Impact Flow Diagram are clearly apparent in this case, as
there were four different nurses involved over a time span of a lit-
tle over ﬁve hours, an anesthesiologist, the postanesthesia care
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larger hospital and regulatory environment). This ensemble of peo-
ple was grouped around the PCA, each with a different perspective,
due to differences in experience and training. Systems become
brittle rather than resilient when organizations allow for multiple
caregivers to operate independently of each other. Just as artifacts
constrain cognition, organizational policies and regulations con-
strain collaboration.
It is also important to emphasize that the patient herself is part
of the system to be monitored and controlled by the hospital staff.
The fact that the patient for a long time had no complaints other
than that she still experienced pain, was correctly explained, ﬁrst
as a programming error, and later as due to an incorrect attach-
ment. Unfortunately, these explanations were limited, partially
correct, and symptom-oriented. Her symptoms of drowsiness once
the morphine was delivered in a massive dose were quite under-
standably normalized as representing a to-be-expected reaction
to the morphine taking effect. Different nurses taking care of the
same patient for brief periods of time leads to the equivalent of
the ‘keyhole effect’ in computer technology: the nurses merely
get a glimpse of a more dynamic and continuous process to which
the patient herself and her daughter had more privileged access (it
is noteworthy that it was the daughter who reported that her
mother was ‘‘feeling weird’’ after the massive injection of mor-
phine). Poor feedback on the patient’s state and behavior then
again led to an inaccurate mental model of her state on the part
of the nurses. This inaccurate model was only corrected by the
anesthesiologist when the patient’s symptoms were so clear that
they could not be ignored any more. The fact that the staff anesthe-
siologist visited the patient during routine pain rounds just after
she had received the massive injection of morphine again empha-
sizes the importance of the ‘keyhole effect’, this time with a fortu-
nate ending (one wonders what would have happened if the
anesthesiologist was held up on his way to the patient).
This case study, using methods such as interviews, chart review
and inspection of historical pump data, went a long way in uncov-
ering the sequence of events leading up to the incident. The
authors adopted the ‘latent failure model’ [75] in that they consid-
ered the various nurses involved as layers of defense, with the acci-
dent progression being stopped by the anesthesiologist who
happened to be at the right time at the right place. Although this
example clearly indicates the importance of inadequate communi-
cations, deﬁcient training, design failures, and unsuitable materi-
als, in the end it fails to adopt systems thinking, because it views
‘human error’ as the only explanatory construct (the authors list
17 potential human errors associated with PCA opioid administra-
tion, of which they claim 6 were present in the current incident).
Putting on different conceptual glasses, we have tried to maintain
a systems perspective, albeit a limited one within the scope of this
paper, by showing how the Impact Flow Diagrammay be helpful in
analyzing this case. In particular, organizational policies and regu-
lations enforce multiple caregivers to obtain piecemeal informa-
tion and impede collaboration. This organizational ‘keyhole
effect’, combined with poor feedback on the patient’s state, led to
only partially correct mental models on the part of the nurses. Note
that this explanation goes beyond the traditional human factors
explanation of accidents in terms of ‘‘loss of situation awareness’’
and does not blame the nurses in any way [76].4. Conclusions, limitations, and recommendations
4.1. Conclusions
Our systematic literature review has shown that most study
methods used to ﬁnd user interface issues with infusion pumps fo-cus on observable behavior rather than on how artifacts shape cog-
nition and collaboration. In terms of the Impact Flow Diagram
developed, most methods deals with operational processes rather
than with representational properties of design or with joint cogni-
tive systems. This is unfortunate, as it limits our deeper under-
standing of the multiple constraints involved in this domain.
Detailed analysis of one case study showed that a deeper under-
standing is limited not so much by the methods employed but
by the conceptual looking glasses that were put on, in other words,
by the, frequently implicit, model of accident causation adopted.
Our results also clearly show that, although several techniques
for usability evaluation testing exist in isolation, the concerted
application of these techniques when testing infusion pumps is
lacking in the literature. There are some advancements reported
in the hospital procurement process where human factors engi-
neering has been taken into account from the outset [35]. Even
though this process may include multiple forms of usability testing
and evaluation, it is still subject to issues such as underrepresenta-
tion of stakeholders, vagueness of criteria by which pumps are
judged, conﬁrmation bias, and time pressure. There are still a lot
of lessons to be learned from detailed descriptions of procurement
processes, yet incorporating human factors principles in hospital
procurement decision-making is, in the long run, essential to iden-
tifying pumps that are difﬁcult to use and that pose potential dan-
gers to patient safety.
Our study showed the importance of going beyond the simple
application of methods to solve particular user-interface problems.
One way of ‘going beyond’ is the adoption of a theoretical perspec-
tive such as the Cognitive Systems Engineering perspective with
the associated Impact Flow Diagram. Assuming that a broad cover-
age of all levels within the Impact Flow Diagram is desirable, we
would recommend combining heuristic analysis, observational
studies of use problems and experimental comparisons, as these
are the methods that were found to yield the broadest range of is-
sues while at the same time suffering from the fewest methodolog-
ical problems, if applied sensibly, that is, with a clear view toward
describing the cognitive processes and representations from a
practitioner’s point of view.
4.2. Limitations
Taken as a whole, the 47 studies retrieved differed widely in
methodology. We therefore grouped them in seven categories. Of
course, this impeded a quantitative meta-analysis, and, due to lack
of detail on statistical measures, it turned out to be impossible to
perform a quantitative synthesis.
Limitations at the review level may have been the incomplete
retrieval of identiﬁed research. However, out of the 232 records
identiﬁed in total, only 5 (2.1%) were identiﬁed through other
sources than database searching [30,38,41,48,56]. This does not
necessarily imply that we identiﬁed all studies, but the percentage
identiﬁed through other sources is small enough to be conﬁdent
that not many studies were missed.
4.3. Recommendations
Every piece of medical device technology is part of and shapes
the human-technology ensemble. Designing for the safe use of
medical technology requires us to recognize this fact. Narrowly
focusing on the improvement of the technology part is bound to
overlook the broader implications of the design process. Research
methods to uncover use problems with technology may be used
in many ways, with many different foci. Our research has shown
that most methods employed in uncovering user-interface
problems focus on observable behavior, to the relative neglect of
the shaping forces of computer technology on representations
194 J.M. Schraagen, F. Verhoeven / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 46 (2013) 181–195and processes. We advocate the adoption of an Impact Flow Dia-
gram perspective rather than merely focusing on usability issues
in isolation. Truly advancing patient safety requires the systematic
adoption of a systems perspective, also in the design of medical de-
vice technology.Acknowledgments
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